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CONSUMER PROTECTION
Ronald L. Hersbergen*
THE CIVIL CODE AS A SOURCE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION

In Louisiana, the seller is bound by a warranty that the thing
sold is reasonably fit for its intended use, that is, free of non-apparent defects which render the thing sold either "absolutely useless"
or "so inconvenient and imperfect [in its use], that it must be supposed that the buyer would not have purchased it, had he known of"
the vice.1 Upon proof of such a defect, and that it existed at the time
of the sale and cannot be remedied by the reasonable efforts of the
seller, the buyer is entitled to annul the sale and to obtain a restoration of the purchase price.! This warranty against the existence of
hidden defects or redhibitory vices arises in every Louisiana sale by
virtue of Civil Code articles 2475 and 2476, as among those things
said by article 1764(2) to be implied from the nature of the agreement of sale. Article 1764(2) also indicates that the seller's implied
warranty may be modified or renounced. But if the general law of
Louisiana can be said to roughly equate that of the common law on
this point, the two systems part company on the issue of modifying
or renouncing the seller's implied warranty of fitness, for an enforceable renunciation (or "waiver") of the redhibition warranty in a
consumer transaction in Louisiana is, in fact, rare. That such is the
case is not at all accidental. Article 1819 requires that consent to
any contract in Louisiana must result from a "free and deliberate
exercise of the will." With respect to the two principal obligations of
the seller in Louisiana, that of delivering the thing which he sells
and that of warranting the thing which he sells3 to be free of hidden
defects or redhibitory vices,' article 2474 has an important commandment: the seller "is bound to explain himself clearly respecting
the extent of his obligations [and] any obscure or ambiguous clause
is [to be] construed against him." Given the widespread use of standard form contracts in consumer sale, loan, lease, and services contracts, that same duty of "clear explanation" is present in most consumer transactions in any event, by virtue of articles 1957 and
*Faculty Member, Louisiana State University.
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1958. 5 In addition, a failure of the seller, lender, lessor, or contractor
to give an explanation or to provide a disclosure can invalidate the
entire contract in a case to which article 1832 has application.'
Basically, then,! the unexplained and/or ambiguous term or phrase is
treated in the Civil Code as one not freely and deliberately consented to and, therefore not enforceable.
From these Civil Code principles-in particular that of article
2474-has emerged a most meaningful jurisprudential rule as to
renunciation or waiver of the implied redhibition warranty: to be
effective, the language of renunciation must appear in the key sale
document;7 be "clear, unambiguous, explicit, unequivocal"; 8 be
5, There are some distinctions between article 2474 and articles 1957-58 that
should be observed. Article 2474 requires only that the seller clearly explain the extent of his obligations (i.e., to deliver the thing sold and to warrant the thing sold). On
the other hand, if the seller (or any other party) has prepared the contract for acceptance by the buyer, then any doubt or obscurity which arises will be construed against
the seller, no matter whose obligations are at issue, if the doubt or obscurity has
arisen for want of a "necessary explanation" which seller ought to have given. Because
the one who prepares the form is almost always the more knowledgeable and experienced
party, an explanation is typically necessary.
Furthermore, there is a distinction to be drawn between an unexplained clause
which is ambiguous, because it admits of conflicting interpretations, and a clause which
is clear and unambiguous but to which the buyer's attention is not directed, particularly
if the buyer is disadvantaged by lack of education or literacy. See Anderson v. Bohn
Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974). Article 2474 applies to both cases,
but articles 1957-58 apply only to the former case.
Finally, a distinction can be seen between articles 2474 and 1957-58 in cases in
which a seemingly unambiguous word or term has an esoteric trade or legal meaning
unknown and unexplained to the layman by the more knowledgeable merchant. See,
e.g., Larriviere v. Roy Young, Inc., 333 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Co., 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Leithman v.
Dolphin Swimming Pool Co., 252 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert denied, 259 La.
1055, 254 So. 2d 464 (1971).
6. The information not disclosed would have to relate to an error as to principal
motive. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1819, 1825 & 1832.
7. Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377
(1972); Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955);
Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). Cf. Kodel Radio
Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 131 So. 462 (1931).
8. The quoted phraseology results from a composite of Louisiana judicial
statements concerning the relationship among Civil Code articles 1764(2), 2474, and
2503. See, e.g., Hob's Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326
(La. 1974); Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Prince v. Paretti Pontiac, Inc., 281
So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Dunlap v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 299 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Harris
v. Automatic Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Cf. Guillory v.
Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). The Harris and Rey cases
cite article 2474 as the source of the rule.
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brought to the attention of the buyer or explained to him;' and,
because it is in derogation of general law, be strictly construed. 0 A
most striking example of the application of the waiver standard is
presented by Thibodeaux v. Meaux's Auto Sales, Inc.," in which the
bill of sale contained the following waiver language:
"... Purchaser ... does hereby waive the warranty of fitness or
guarantee against the redhibitory vices applied in Louisiana by
operation of law, more specifically, that warranty imposed by
AdditionCivil Code Article 2476, or other applicable law ....
ally, I forfeit any right I may have in redhibition pursuant to
Civil Code Article 2520 and following articles, subject to the
12
above described restricted warranty ....
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that this language was
neither written in "clear and unambiguous terms," nor was it (or its
meaning) brought to the buyer's attention or explained to him. The
court maintained that:
[T]he language of this purported waiver is couched in legal
terms, and not in terms which may be read and understood by a
layman. The requirement "clear and unambiguous" means that
the language used must be comprehensible by the average
buyer. The plaintiff, a woman with a sixth grade education,
stated that she did not know the meaning of the words "redhibitory vices," "redhibition," nor was she acquainted with the provisions of the Civil Code cited in the instrument. The plaintiff
cannot be expected to be acquainted with these legal terms or
their implications. This instrument did not contain "clear and unambiguous" language.
The instrument also fails to meet the requirement that it
must be explained to the buyer or brought to her attention. The
testimony of the salesman . . . reflects that he did not explain
nor did he point out the waiver to the plaintiff. He stated that
he did not know what the waiver provisions meant.'3
9. See, e.g., Prince v. Paretti Pontiac, Inc., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Hendricks
v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Harris v. Automatic
Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
10. See, e.g., Dufief v. Boykin, 9 La. Ann. 295 (1854); Wolfe v. Henderson Ford,
Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Harris v. Automatic Enterprises, Inc., 145
So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
11. 364 So. 2d 1370 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
12. Id. at 1371.
13. Id. at 1371-72 (citations omitted). The court distinguished the waiver language
held valid by Foy v. Ed Taussig, Inc., 220 So. 2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), as being
more explicit and understandable by an ordinary buyer. The Foy language was:
[Ilt is specifically understood between the buyer and seller that this sale is made
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From the standard for valid renunciation which Thibodeaux
epitomizes, it should follow that: 1) language found in a buyer's
order, a manufacturer's warranty pamphlet, an invoice, or in any
document other than the key sale document simply cannot constitute a valid renunciation of the redhibition warranty, no matter how
clear, unambiguous, or explained it was, and regardless of whether
the consumer's attention was drawn to it;1' 2) language in the key
sale document that is specific, unequivocal, clear, and unambiguous
must still be explained or brought to the attention of the consumer15
in an unambiguous manner; 3) there can be no meaningful explanation of, or attention drawn to, ambiguous renunciation language; 7 4)
language in fine print will be neither clear and unambiguous nor
brought to the consumer's attention, 8 nor will other inconspicuous
language satisfy the requirement; 9 5) the language "as is" or "no
without any warranty whatsoever, express or implied, except as to title, and the
buyer herein specifically waives the implied warranty provided for by Louisiana
law, including all warranties against vices or defects or fitness for any particular
purposes. This express waiver shall be considered a material and integral part of
any sale which may hereafter be entered into between the parties covering the
automobile herein described.
220 So. 2d at 238. In Hendrick v. Horseless Carriage,Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976), the bill of sale stipulated that buyer "buy[s] this car with no warranty"; and,
though the transaction was consummated beneath a sign stating, in eight-inch letters,
"All Cars Sold As Is! Please Test Before Buying," the renunciation language was held
not to be "clear and unambiguous." 332 So. 2d at 893. The language was, however, held
to have been brought to buyer's attention. On the other hand, in Wolfe v. Henderson
Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), language closely approximating that
of the Foy case was ineffective because the seller had not "explained" it, no doubt
because the salesman testified that he, like his counterpart in the Thibodeaux case, did
not know what was meant by a "vice" in a car.
14. Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La. 1973); Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377
(1972); Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So. 2d 830 (1955);
Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974). Cf. Kodel Radio
Corp. v. Shuler, 171 La. 469, 131 So. 402 (1931).
15. Harris v. Drexler Motor Co., Inc., 339 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976);
Anderson v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 291 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Lee v. Blanchard,
264 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet Co., 260 So.
2d 919 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
16. Edwards v. Port AMC/Jeep, Inc., 337 So. 2d 276 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
17. Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). Cf. Harris v.
Automatic Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
18. Guillory v. Morein Motor Co., 322 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lee v.
Blanchard, 264 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972). Cf. Kodel Radio Corp. v. Shuler, 171
La. 469, 131 So. 402 (1930).
19. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Henderson Ford, Inc., 277 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973); Harris v. Automatic Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
Both Wolfe and Harris involve waiver language on the backside of the document.
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warranties of any kind" will not, of itself, renounce the warranty, 0
though it may modify it;2 6) the presence of an express warranty
does not of itself constitute, a renunciation of the implied warranty,22
even if it is "in lieu of" other warranties or limits the seller's obligation to repair or to replace defective parts."
In 1977 the state of New York enacted a statute requiring the
use of "plain English" in certain consumer contracts.2 The New
York law requires that such contracts be written in "a clear and
coherent manner using words with common and every day meaning."25
The New York law apparently prompted the introduction of plain
English bills in about twenty states.2" Three or more of these bills
would require contract language "which can be understood at least
by a person of average intelligence."2 The Thibodeaux case stands
as a testimonial to Civil Code articles 1958 and 2474, which alleviate
the need for a plain English statute in Louisiana.
Apparent defects are not among those treated by the Civil Code
as redhibitory in nature;28 accordingly, decisions as to the apparency
20. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1976); Juneau v. Bob McKinnon Chevrolet Co., 260 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972); McLain v. Cuccia, 259 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Beneficial Finance Co.
v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971); Breeden v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 140 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Two of the earlier cases to adopt
this view are Roby Motors Co. v. Cade, 158 So. 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), and United
Motor Car Co. v. Drumm, 3 La. App. 741 (Orl. Cir. 1926).
21. Beneficial Fianance Co. v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir..1971);
Maddox v. Katz, 8 So. 2d 749 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942); Roby Motors Co. v. Cade, 158
So. 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
22. Hob's Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La.
1974); Bendana v. Mossy Motors, Inc., 347 So. 2d 946 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Bernard
v. Tiner, 181 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955). Cf. Hoffman v. All Star Ins. Corp. 288 So. 2d 388 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974); Hebert v. Claude Y. Woolfolk Corp., 176 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965).
23. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America,
Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972); Hoffman v. All Star Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d 388
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Bernard v. Tiner, 181 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Harris v. Automatic Enterprises, Inc., 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). Cf. Hob's
Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 (La. 1974); Hebert v.
Claude Y. Woolfolk Corp., 176 So. 2d 814 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
24. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1977). Section 5-701 was amended in
1978 and re-designated as section 5-702. The Act applies to all written residential
leases and all other written corsumer agreements respecting money, property or services intended primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Agreements involving amounts in excess of $50,000 are excluded.
25. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney 1978). The section also requires that
the written contract be "appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections."
26. O'Connor, Plain English, 34 Bus. LAW. 1453 (1979).
27. These states are Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Id. at 1456 n.9.
28. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2521.
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of defects are of great importance to the consumer-buyer in Louisiana. Particularly is this true in the case of the home purchase,
typically the most important of all consumer purchases. The presence of a real estate broker in a consumer home purchase is virtually universal, as is the listing sheet prepared by the broker for
the benefit of potential buyers. The listing sheet typically assumes a
standard format and contains a significant amount of information
,about the specifications of the listed residence. The 1974 decision of
the second circuit in White v. Lamar Realty, Inc. 9 cast substantial
doubt on the degree to which a home buyer could rely on brokerprepared erroneous information about the listed residence whenever
the true state of fact was discernable by inspection.
The buyer in White unsuccessfully sought rescission of a home
purchase upon discovery that the dimensions of several rooms in the
house were not as large as the specification sheet had represented.
Because the buyer had in fact inspected the premises, it was held
that he could not assert that he had been deceived by the broker."0
The fourth circuit recently rendered an opinion in which the redhibition issue was squarely raised against a factual background quite
1
similar to White. The case, Bernofsky v. Schwartz,"
permitted inspecting buyers to nevertheless rely on an information sheet prepared by the seller and the seller's broker that erroneously listed a
20 feet by 13 feet den as having dimensions of 24 feet by 13 feet.
The court found that the size of the den was one of the principal
motives that prompted the buyer to purchase the home and that,
because the defect32 related to exact rather than approximate dimensions, there was no reason for the buyer to question the accuracy of
the information. Additionally, the opinion stresses that the buyer
could not be expected to have noticed by simple inspection an inaccuracy that several experienced realtors had failed to detect. With
29. 303 So. 2d 598 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 600-02. The White case discussed the buyer's duty to inspect against a
background composed of articles 1847, 2315, and 3018, in light of the buyer's primary
contention that he relied on statements made in the broker's multiple listing sheet.
The court dismissed the action against the vendor due to the buyer's failure to timely
cure vagueness in his petition, thus pretermitting discussion of articles 2521 and 2529.
As against the broker's possible fraud under either article 1847(9) or 2315, buyer was
held not entitled to damages because the defects he alleged would have been
discoverable upon an inspection of the home, which he was afforded prior to the sale.
Since buyer did in fact inspect the property, the inference drawn by the trial court,
and affirmed by the second circuit, was that he did not rely on the representation. The
court cited La Croix v. Recknage 230 La. 842, 89 So. 2d 363 (1956), and Rocchi v.
Schwabacher, 33 La. Ann. 1364 (1881).
31. 370 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 593, citing LA. CIv. CODE art. 2529.
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respect to residential home purchases, the fourth circuit's Bernofsky
case seems soundly premised upon articles 2520 and 2529" and
achieves a realistic interpretation of article 2521 in the home sale
context."
UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES

The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
33. Civil Code article 2531's "opportunity to repair" provisions do not apply to
cases such as White and Bernofsky, because the defects arise from article 2529 and are
not repairable.
34. The White ruling unquestionably makes more sense in the context of a sale of
real estate by a metes and bounds description (with a statement made as to acreage)
than to a sale of a home as to the square footage of which a supposedly qualified
broker has made, not an estimate, but an apparently mathematically computed assessment. Cf. American Guar. Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., 208 La. 772, 23 So. 2d
409 (1944); Exchange Bank v. E.B. Williams & Co., 120 La. 901, 45 So. 935 (1908).
If a fraud case similar to White should arise because of a statement by the vendor
or broker as to square footage, Rocchi v. Schwabacher,33 La. Ann. 1364 (1881), should
be re-examined. In the first place, the statement as to dimension or square footage
would, as Bernofsky holds, come under article 2529. While the relationship between
that article and article 2521 is not necessarily clear, it would seem that a statement as
to the (purported) exact square footage of a residence in effect advises the buyer not
to bother making his own computation. On its own merits, square footage is probably
not redhibitory and only becomes so by virtue of the declaration thereof as a quality of
the thing. At the very least, the characterof the buyer's inspection would be affected.
Cf. Edward v. Glasson, 12 La. Ann. 586 (1857); Berret v. Adams, 10 La. Ann. 77 (1855);
Millaudon v. Prince, 3 La. Ann. 4 (1848); Peoples Furniture and Gift v. Carson
Hicks/Freidrichs Refrigeration, Inc., 326 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); AtlanticGulf Supply Corp. v. McDonald, 175 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Contributory
negligence ought not be a defense to fraud or an article 2529 declaration. Contrary to
the trial court's ruling, affirmed in White, logic does not necessarily indicate that an
action for damages under article 1847 would be subject to the same defenses as an action to rescind brought under the same article. 303 So. 2d at 601. Cf. American Guar.
Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., 208 La. 772, 23 So. 2d 409 (1944). In American
Guaranty Co., the one misrepresenting stood before the court and pleaded that the
defrauded party unwisely or carelessly trusted him and placed too much confidence in
his honesty and truthfulness. The court held that this did not constitute a valid
defense, particularly where the one misrepresenting is an expert.
A second and more fundamental reason requires a re-examination of the Rocchi approach in residential home sales: the theoretical basis of the case (both parties had
equal means of knowledge) was taken from Slaughter's Administrator v. Gerson, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 379 (1871),'and undeniably smacks of common law caveat emptor. In
short, a common law notion may have crept into the 1881 decision in Rocchi and, unfortunately, it may have germinated. At about this time in Louisiana jurisprudential
history, the Louisiana Supreme Court was heard to say that "the rule of law is caveat
emptor." McGuire v. Kearny, Blois & Co., 17 La. Ann. 295 (1865).
In any event, a buyer can certainly rely on the seller's representations whenever
an inspection is difficult or inconvenient, Atlantic-Gulf Supply Corp. v. McDonald, 175
So. 2d 6 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), or where seller conceals the facts from buyer, Bermes
v. Facell, 328 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Aubry v. Todd, 55 So. 2d 276 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1952).
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Law"5 declares unlawful "unfair or deceptive" acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce. The law offers no definitions
of the terms "unfair" or "deceptive"; but it has been recognized that
the legislature patterned the law upon section 45(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 19146 intending, upon familiar rules of
statutory construction, 7 that Louisiana courts should consider the
interpretations of the federal law by federal courts and the FTC in
determining the meaning of "unfair and deceptive" acts or practices
under the Louisiana statute. 8 Accordingly, there exists a reservoir
of federal caselaw bearing heavily on the scope and application of
the Louisiana statute.
In over six years of statutory life, the Louisiana consumer protection law has engendered only a handful of decisions." Recently,
however, significant issues of substance and procedure under the
Act have been before the Louisiana courts. In Moore v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., 0 it was alleged that the action of Goodyear's
employees in wrongfully seizing 1 items of personal property from
plaintiff's trailer home constituted an unfair act or practice under
the Louisiana statute. In holding that the defendant had violated the
statute, the second circuit offered a working definition of an unfair
practice:
In determining whether a practice is unfair under the
federal act, a rule, based on Federal Trade Commission criteria,
has been established that a practice is unfair when it offends
established public policy and when the practice is immoral,
35. LA. R.S. 51:1401-18 (Supp. 1972).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1975).
37. See State v. Baddock, 170 So. 2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
38. See Guste v. Demars, 330 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
39. State v. Council of City of New Orleans, 309 So. 2d 290 (La. 1976) (utility late
charge billing practice held not a deceptive trade practice); State v. Crossroads
Gallery, 357 So. 2d 1381 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978) (comparative pricing practice held to
be "unfair and deceptive"); Guste v. Demars, 330 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976)
(contractor's guarantee of quality not shown to be in violation of the Act); General Investment, Inc. v. Gaudet, 303 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (seizure of automobile
not in compliance with legal requirements held an unfair or deceptive act); Faris v.
Model's Guild, 297 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (offering of course of instruction
by one not licensed as required by law was inferably in violation of the Act). See also
Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. La. 1975).
40. 364 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
41. Repossession or seizure of goods sans judicial process or consent constitutes a
wrongful (i.e., tortious) act. See, e.g., Grandeson v. International Harvester Credit
Corp., 223 La. 504, 66 So. 2d 317 (1953); Samaniego v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 350 So.
2d 193 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Lee v. Lewis, 339 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (all
cited in the Moore case). See also Fassit v. United T.V. Rental, Inc., 297 So. 2d 283 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to
consumers....
The collection actions of Goodyear in entering Moore's home
and taking possession of his property . . ., without Moore's
knowledge and consent, amounts to an unfair trade act or practice under the Louisiana statute, applying common meanings to
the words of the statute. Applying the federal criteria, the
defendant's actions offended established public policy, constituted actions which have long been recognized in Louisiana as
unlawful and as entitling the injured party to damages, were oppressive and unscrupulous, and caused substantial and actual injury to a consumer."2
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently held in State v.
General Motors Corp.'I that the Attorney General is entitled to bring
a class action for restitution or diminution of price as a part of his
authority to enforce the consumer protection statute." The case involved General Motors' failure to disclose to Louisiana buyers that
certain motor vehicles were equipped with engines not manufactured by the General Motors division that manufactured the
vehicle.' 5
Whether undisclosed component-part substitution is an unfair or
deceptive act or practice was an issue not reached in the General
Motors case, but the third circuit has recently held in the affirmative on that issue in Gour v. Daray Motor Co." The case involved
the purchase of an Oldsmobile model automobile equipped with a
Chevrolet engine (ie., the same subject matter as in the Attorney
General's General Motors class action); Daray Motors and General
Motors were held to have violated the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law. General Motors' violation rested upon
deliberate misrepresentationof the substitution; 7 Daray Motors was
42. 364 So. 2d at 533-34 (citations omitted). The court cited F.T.C. v. Sperry and
Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), and Spiegle, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1976). The Spiegel case had found that the mail order company's practice of filing
lawsuits against mail order credit customers in Illinois under the Illinois long-arm
statute to be an unfair practice under the federal law. Cf. General Inv., Inc. v. Gaudet,
303 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
43. 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1979) (on rehearing).
44. See Note, The Class Action as a Consumer Protection Device: State v.
General Motors Corp., 40 LA. L. REV. 497 (1980).
45. It was alleged that General Motors sold in Louisiana some 1,100 Oldsmobiles
equipped not with an Oldsmobile engine, but with an engine from, for example, the
Chevrolet division of General Motors. 370 So. 2d at 478.
46. 373 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
47. The source of the engine was not only concealed from the buying public by
coded engine numbers on the window sticker; it was deliberately misrepresented by
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held to have become a party to that misrepresentation by failing to
disclose adequately the true source of the engine. The two defendants were held to be solidarily liable as joint tortfeasors for a return
of the purchase price, 8 less a credit for use.49
AUTOMOBILE SALES

Federal law imposes liability of up to $1,500 on a transferor who
knowingly sells a motor vehicle bearing a false odometer reading. 0
The victimized motor vehicle buyer faces no requirement of privity
with a violator of the law. Violation of the federal law was not, however, the main bone of contention in the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Chapotel v. Bailey Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.51 The buyer unsuccessfully sought reversal of the court of appeal decision52 finding
solidary liability for the federal statutory penalty,"3 rather than
separate and individual liability, as between the immediate seller's
transferor corporation and the individual violators who were corporate agents thereof. The buyer did obtain a reversal of the court
of appeal's ruling on attorney's fees. Under the federal law, reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded in "any successful action" to
the act of General Motors in placing on the engine's air cleaner what the court calls
"an eye-catching, red and black on silver decal" which read "Oldsmobile 350." 1I at
573.
48. A substituted major component parts case, such as either Daray or General
Motors, probably does not support a "return of the purchase price" redhibition action,
although a "reduction of price" action probably is appropriate in some cases. See Gates
v. Dykes, 338 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Violette v. Capital City Auto Co., 4
La. App. 465 (1st Cir. 1926); But see Dupuy v. Blotner Bros., 6 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942) (of a 1935 Chrysler equipped with a Plymouth engine, the court remarked,
"The motors of these two makes of cars of that year were interchangeable," inferentially ruling that the buyer would have experienced no great inconvenience or imperfection); Beyer v. Estopinal, 70 So. 2d 109 (La. 1954); Ganucheau v. Griff, 181 So. 2d
854 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Port Finance Co. v. Campbell, 94 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957); Castille v. Champ Auto Sales, 92 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
However, one can argue that rescission may be premised upon a vice of consent. See
Barnidge v. Cappel Motor Co., 12 La. App. 216, 125 So. 778 (2d Cir. 1930); Cockrell v.
Capital City Auto, 3 La. App. 385 (Orl. Cir. 1925). Cf. Tauzin v. Sam Broussard
Plymouth, 282 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
49. Defendants would have simply multiplied the normal rental value of the car
($179 per month) by the buyer's fourteen months of use. But as the court points out,
rental figures include a profit for the lessor, and defendants were held not entitled
under the circumstances to profit from buyer's use of the car. Citing its own prior decision in Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth, 368 So. 2d 747 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1979), the third circuit allowed a credit of eight cents per mile for 17,000 miles.
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-91 (1972).
51. 363 So. 2d 451 (La. 1978).
52. 355 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1972).
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enforce the liability imposed by the law.' Plaintiff-buyer had obtained a judgment for the minimum statutory recovery of $1,500,
which was the amount that defendants had originally offered in settlement. Had plaintiff-buyer, therefore, been "successful"? The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff's legal action could
not properly be characterized as unsuccessful in that he had raised
important questions of law under the federal statute and in that,
under the plain language of the statute, he had not been the loser.
The possibility that concealment of true mileage, or a misrepresentation regarding same, will be a vice of consent,55 or a redhibitory vice," creates the potentiality of consumer-buyer success under
both federal and state law.57 The supreme court, however, categorized the federal law as authorizing the recovery of actual damages
only, not penalties." To so interpret the federal odometer law would
prevent dual recoveries under state and federal law. Unfortunately,
section 1989 of the federal law appears to contain a penalty feature
by stipulating for liability "in an amount equal to the sum of .. .
three times the amount of actual damages sustained [and costs/attorney's fees] or $1,500 [and costs/attorney's fees], whichever is the
greater." Thus, the buyer of a motor vehicle sold in violation of the
federal law is entitled to a minimum recovery of $1,500 even if he
shows no actual damages. The federal odometer law is thus similar
to the federal truth-in-lending law, which unquestionably permits
the recovery of a penalty. 9
RATES OF CHARGE IN CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
0
In a precomputed consumer credit transaction,"
the Louisiana
Consumer Credit Law provides that if the maturity is accelerated
for any reason and suit is filed, "thereafter the obligation sued upon
shall be deemed to bear a loan finance charge"1 or credit s ervice

54. 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1972).
55. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1832 & 1847. See Sunseri v. Westbank Motors, 228 La.
370, 82 So. 2d 43 (1955).
56. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2520 & 2559. Cf. Hanna v. Stovall, 171 So. 2d 678 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1965); Aiken v. Moran Motor Co., 165 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Murphy v. Etridge-Atkins Corp., 185 So. 487 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Twin City Motor Co.
v. Pettit, 177 So. 814 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
57. In Chapote, plaintiffs immediate seller might have avoided the federal law on
the knowledge issue and still have been liable for a restoration or reduction of the
price under articles 2520 and 2541-43.
58. 363 So. 2d at 454. The court so spoke in the context of multiple recoveries
sought by plaintiff.
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1974).
60. LA. R.S. 9:3516(22) (Supp. 1972).
61. LA. R.S. 9:3516(20) (Supp. 1972).
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charge 2 on the amount due not to exceed the rate previously charged
on the obligation.""3 But section 3522 of the law also provides that
beginning one year after contractual maturity, the loan finance
charge or the credit service charge on a precomputed consumer
credit transaction "may not thereafter exceed eight percent per annum." 6' In Evangeline Bank & Trust Co. v. Guillory,5 the third circuit interpreted the Consumer Credit Law as authorizing a creditor
to charge as much interest after maturity as charged in the original
transaction, 6 but only for a period of one year after contractual
maturity.6 7 Thereafter, the creditor's charges fall within the eight
percent per annum limit of section 3522 of the law. Because the note
signed by the consumer in Guillory provided for interest at the rate
of ten percent per annum from date of maturity, with no limitation
as to the one year post-maturity period, the interest charge was
usurious; and the entire interest on the note was subject to forfeiture."
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY

Because "[credit has ceased to be a luxury item," Congress passed
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act"' to establish "as clear national
policy that no credit applicant shall be denied the credit he or she
needs and wants on the basis of characteristics that have nothing to
do with his or her creditworthiness."7 The Act provides in pertinent
part that "[iut shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transac62. LA. R.S. 9:3516(14) (Supp. 1972).
63. LA. R.S. 9:3529 (Supp. 1972).
64. LA. R.S. 9:3522 (Supp. 1972).
65. 364 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
66. In Guillory, the original rate of charge was 17.97 percent. Under Revised
Statutes 9:3519, the bank could have charged within a maximum of 36 percent per year
on the unpaid principal amount of the loan, or up to 18 percent per year on the unpaid
balances of the amount borrowed.
67. The presence in the contract of a right to accelerate the contractual maturity
date makes the term "contractual maturity" quite flexible.
68. LA. R.S. 9:3501 (1950). The court relied on Thrift Funds of Baton Rouge, Inc.
v. Jones, 274 So. 2d 150 (La.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). See Professor Johnson's
discussion of Jones, in The Work of the LouisianaAppellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231, 238-44 (1974).
The creditor in Guillory did recover the amount of principalowed by the borrower,
as well as attorney's fees and insurance premiums. The loans in Jones had violated the
Louisiana Small Loan Law, LA. R.S. 6:571-93 (1950, repealed 1974), which called for a
forfeiture not only of all interest, but also of principal. 274 So. 2d at 157.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91f (1976). The Act is accompanied by a set of regulations
known as "Regulation B," found at 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1979).
70. 119761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 405.
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tion . . . on the basis of ... sex or marital status."'" In 1975 Louisiana enacted an equal credit opportunity law,"2 making unlawful
both the refusal of credit by an extender of credit"8 on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, and the
requirement that an applicant meet credit qualification standards
not required of other persons similarly situated."
The federal law requires that a creditor give to an applicant
against whom "adverse action" is taken a statement of specific
reasons for such action."5 "Adverse action" means a denial or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount requested or on substantially the terms requested." A creditor cannot
avoid liability for failure to give a statement of reasons for adverse
action, by maintaining that no application" had in fact been madeand hence no denial thereof-if the creditor discouraged the wouldbe applicant from making the application."8 Thus, where there has
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976). The Act also sets out, as forbidden bases of
discrimination, race, color, religion, national origin, age, and public assistance income
derivation. Section 1691e makes any creditor who violates the Act liable to the aggrieved applicant for any actual damages sustained and for punitive damages of up to
$10,000. Actions may be maintained individually or as a member of a class. The term
"creditor" is defined in section 1691a(e) as any person "who regularly extends, renews,
or continues credit." The terms "credit" and "applicant" are defined in subsection
1691a(b) and (d) so as to include applicants for commercial as well as consumer, credit.
72. LA. R.S. 9:3581-85 (Supp. 1959).
73. The Louisiana Act contains no definition of "extender of credit," but that term
is defined in the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law. LA. R.S. 9:3510-71 (Supp. 1972). But
the latter Act comprises chapter 2 of Code title XII-Of Loan-in the Civil Code Ancillaries, while the Equal Credit Opportunity Act forms chapter 3 thereof. The definition of "extender of credit," in section 3516(16), however, applies only as that term is
used in chapter 2. Still, the plain meaning of the words "extender" and "credit" would
seem to lead to no insurmountable problems.
74. LA. R.S. 9:3583 (Supp. 1979). The Louisiana Act does not expressly set forth
age or public assistance income derivation as forbidden bases of discrimination; but the
"standards not required" language may prohibit discrimination on either basis. For example, a welfare recipient with public assistance income of $600 per month is, with
respect to gross income, "similarly situated" as to a person with income from the
private sector of $600 per month. On the other hand, an applicant nearing a mandatory
retirement age may not be "similarly situated" as to a much younger applicant.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d) (1976). The Louisiana Act has no such requirements. Not
all creditors are required to make a written statement of reasons. See 15 U.S.C. §
1691(d)(5) (1976).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1974).
77. Given the definition of "adverse action" in section 1691(d)(6), that term is
keyed to an application for credit in the cases in which no credit relationship then exists between the parties. Regulation B defines "application" as an oral or written request for credit made "in accordance with procedures established" by the creditor for
the type of credit requested. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f) (1979).
78. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1979).
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been no statement of reasons for adverse action, 9 a self-professed
aggrieved party will predictably attempt to show either that the application was discriminatorily denied or that the making of an application was discouraged. Thames v. City National Bank of Baton
Rouge 0 was such a case.
Mrs. Thames desired to obtain a loan for the purchase price of
an automobile. For that purpose she presented herself to Mr. Quinn,
manager of one of the defendant-bank's branches, and the two parties discussed Mrs. Thames' desire for a loan. Although the specifics
of the conversation were disputed, the one fact that clearly emerged
from the meeting was a denial of the loan for Mrs. Thames. She
sued the bank claiming a violation of the federal Act, but the jury
returned a defendant's verdict. The First Circuit Court of Appeal,
functioning in the manner of a federal appellate court,"' affirmed.
At its most basic level, the Thames decision simply highlights
the difficult fact issues inherently involved in an equal credit opportunity case, whether under the federal or state law. But Thames is
one of those decisions that leaves the perusing lawyer intellectually
dissatisfied; something is clearly amiss in the case. For the jury to
have returned a verdict in favor of the bank, it would have to have
made the following findings of fact: 1) Mrs. Thames was not discouraged from making an application, but rather did so; 2) The application was either not "denied" or, if it was denied, it was not denied
on a discriminatory basis; and 3) If the application was denied, a sufficient statement of specific reasons for that adverse action was
given to Mrs. Thames. It seems clear that Mrs. Thames did make an
oral application for credit 2 in her own name, that the bank manager
denied that application on the basis of the inadequacy of her income
and her lack of a sufficient down payment for the desired automobile, 3 and that the manager did indicate to her that the desired
loan could be made if a third-party would act as a co-signer." A
directed verdict on the "discouragement" issue had been granted
defendant at trial. Thus, "adverse action" had occurred, requiring a
determination of the basis for the denial and the sufficiency of the
statement of reasons.
The bank could lawfully have either denied credit to Mrs.
Thames or offered to grant it solely upon a co-signed obligation, only
79. The adequacy of a statement of reasons for adverse action was before the
court in Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. La. 1977).
80. 370 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
81. Id. at 893-94.
82. Id. at 893.
83. Id.
84. Id.

1980]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979

633

if the bank would have denied or conditioned the same amount of
credit to a male applicant similarly situated as to income and down
payment ability. Assuming that such is factually plausible, there
would be no violation of the anti-discrimination provisions of the
law. However, it clearly appears that Mrs. Thames did not receive a
statement of reasons for adverse action that would comply with the
requirements of the Act.85 Furthermore, the sufficiency of the statement of reasons for adverse action, as the sufficiency of disclosure of
the cost of credit," is an issue of law not appropriate for jury determination. 7
In defense of the first circuit, it may be that the jury was not required to reach the issue of the sufficiency of the statement of
reasons. But that conclusion would have to be premised upon a finding of no adverse action or no application for credit. Because the
bank was at best willing only to grant the requested credit if there
be a co-signer of Mrs. Thames, there was adverse action in that such
was a "refusal to grant credit . . .on substantially the terms re-

quested."88 Therefore, the statement of reasons issue was avoidable
only upon the basis that no application for credit was actually made.
Yet, both Mrs. Thames and the bank seemed to have assumed that
an application" for credit had been made." If, despite the
characterizations of the parties, the jury could find that no applica85. Assuming that the bank does not qualify under section 1691(d)(5) (and almost
certainly it would not), the only written communication from the bank to Mrs. Thames

that could have satisfied the statement of reasons requirement was a letter sent to her
in response to her written request for a statement of the reasons why her application
had not been accepted. The bank's letter not only fails to state "the specific reasons
for the adverse action taken" [15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(3)], but it also fails to state any
reason at all for the adverse action. 370 So. 2d at 893. In Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A.,
434 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. La. 1977), the aggrieved applicant had no major credit cards and
no savings account; and she had been employed for only one year. Yet, Exxon's sole
stated reason for adverse action was that the credit bureau had been able to furnish
little or no definitive credit information. The eastern district held that the statement
was insufficient under section 1691(d)(3). 434 F. Supp. at 562.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-39 (1974).
87. The Thames opinion states that the issue is one to be resolved by the trier of
fact. 370 So. 2d at 894. The Carroll court states, "The legal issue before this Court,
then, is whether Exxon's responses to the plaintiff satisfy the notification requirements of [section 202.9]." 434 F. Supp. at 562 (emphasis added).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1974).
89. See note 77, supra.
90. The court, in synoptically reporting the testimony of the branch manager,
states, "[H]e evaluated her oral application .. .." 370 So. 2d at 893. The letter sent to
Mrs. Thames by the bank stated in pertinent part that the "transaction" had been
handled "in the routine manner in which your previous credit requests were handled."
Id. (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, the bank's letter also stated that "we are
anxious to receive an application from you for the particular request." Id.
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tion had been made, the issue of possible application-discouragement
should not have been taken from jury consideration by directed verdict, for that action left the plaintiff in a conundrum for purposes of
appeal.
Though there is no implication that such was the practice of
City National Bank, the Federal Reserve Board has become concerned
with the problem of informal credit inquiries. For example, if the
response to Mrs. Thames' inquiry of the branch manager was, in
essence, "don't bother making a formal application unless you have a
co-signor lined up," the bank could assert that it was only fielding a
general credit inquiry or was responding to an application for credit
not made in accordance with the bank's established procedures 9 requiring a formal, written application. Such an approach by the bank
would too easily discourage applications by the very class of persons
which the act seeks to protect. The Federal Reserve Board has
taken the position that if a creditor in fact passes judgment on an
individual's eligibility for credit in response to an informal, oral inquiry, or in response to some other form of communication falling
short of established formal procedures, then there has been an application for credit made in accordance with the creditor's de facto
established procedures.92
91. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f) (1979).
92. FRB ECOA Letter No. 8 (April 20, 1978), construing Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §
202.2(f) (1979). See [19781 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 42,103.

